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Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j) (2009), reserving the prerogative to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals. 
This Court also has jurisdiction under the Constitution of the State of Utah. Utah Const. 
Art.VIII, § 3. 
Issues Presented for Review 
I. Did the State of Utah adequately plead its causes of action under the Utah 
False Claims Act and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Standard of Review: "The dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. 
Also, we review the interpretation and application of a statute for correctness, giving no 
deference to the district court's legal conclusions." Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, \ 9, 
223 P.3d 1128, 1131. 
Issue Preserved: 
a. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 662-690; Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, 10-14, 
22-23). 
b. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss dated 12/19/08 at 30-36. 
c. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss dated 12/11/09 at 29, 32-35, 39-43. 
d. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 1061-1073; Mem. Decision at 2-7). 
e. Petition for Permission to Appeal (Utah R. App. P. 5) (03/10/09). (R. at 1080-
1089; Pet. for Permission to Appeal, 4-5). 
f. State's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint. (R. at 1493-1624; State's Resp. in Opp., 14-22). 
g. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 2055-2070; Mem. Decision, 2-12). 
II. Is the State's claim under the False Claims Act barred under the applicable 
statute of limitations? 
Standard of Review: "The district court's application of a statute of limitations is a 
question of law which we review for correctness." Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 
59,T]95193P.3d86. 
Issue Preserved: 
a. Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 662-690; Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, 3-4, 7-
9, 22). 
b. Plaintiffs Supplemental Submission of Authority in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 1004-1029; PL's Supplemental Submission of 
Authority, 2-4). 
c. Transcript of hearing on Motion to Dismiss dated December 19, 2008 at 36-37. 
d. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 1061-1073; Mem. Decision, 8-9). 
e. Petition for Permission to Appeal (Utah R. App. P. 5) (02/20/09). (R. at 1080-
1089; Pet. for Permission to Appeal, 2-4). 
f. State's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint. (R. at 1493-1624; State's Resp. in Opp., 18). 
g. Memorandum Decision. (R. at 2055-2070; Mem. Decision, 3, 10). 
Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
The following constitutional provision applies: Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3. 
The following statutes apply: Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 (Supp. 2009) (effective 
Apr. 30, 2007) (amending § 26-20-1 (2004)); Utah Code Ann. 78A-3-102 (3)0) (2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-101 et seg.; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(2) (2010); Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-2-307 (3) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309 (2008). 
The following rules apply: Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a), 9(b), & 12(b)(6). 
Statement of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
This case will determine the State's ability to bring attorney general actions to 
enforce the Utah False Claims Act ("Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 et seq. (2004) 
(Addendum A), and protect the fiscal integrity of Utah's Medicaid program. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On May 8, 2008, the State of Utah filed a civil action against Apotex Corporation, 
et al (hereinafter "Defendants"), in the Third District Court for violations of the Utah 
False Claims Act (Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 (2004)) and fraudulent misrepresentation 
against the State's Medicaid program. According to the complaint, Defendants are 
pharmaceutical companies that manufacture and provide medical drugs to Medicaid 
3 
recipients.1 See Addendum B, Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint at ^ 10 (R. at 041). 
The drugs are paid for by state Medicaid funding. 
The State's first complaint alleged that Defendants' conduct violated the Utah 
False Claims Act, which prohibits the making of Medicaid claims based on false or 
misleading information. PL's First Am. Compl. fflf 57-60 (R. at 054-055). The complaint 
also alleged that Defendants were guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at fflf 61-67 
(R. at 055-056). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to properly plead 
a violation of the False Claims Act, failure to properly state a claim of fraud uwith 
particularity" under Rule 9(b) (Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) attached hereto as Addendum C), and 
for seeking retroactive application of the False Claim's Act's 2007 legislative 
amendments. See Addendum D, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 13, 2009 (R. at 1061-
1073). The trial court granted Defendants' motion as to the complaint's specificity under 
Rule 9(b) and its interpretation of the False Claims Act, and agreed that only limited 
portions of the 2007 amendments should be applied retroactively. Id. The trial court, 
however, gave the State the opportunity to file a Second Amended Complaint, which the 
State did. Id.; see also PL's Second Am. Compl. (R. at 1117-1185). Defendants filed 
renewed 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the new complaint with mostly the same arguments 
as the first. See Addendum E, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 26, 2010 (R. at 2055-2070). 
Often confused with Medicare, Medicaid is a needs-based program that provides 
medical care to the indigent and disabled. While Medicaid is created under a federal 
enabling statute and does receive federal funding, it is administered and run by the states. 
Thus, Utah has its own Medicaid program for which it is responsible. 
This time, the trial court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed the case with 
prejudice. Id. 
This appeal by the State follows. On appeal, the State challenges the trial court's 
ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and its application of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Utah False Claims Act, and the statute of limitations. 
Statement of Facts 
Medicaid Drug Reimbursement Program 
Utah Medicaid pays for the full range of medical care needed by roughly 300,000 
recipients, including prescription drugs. PL's Second Am. Compl. f^ 105 (R. at 1135). 
Prescription drug benefits represent a significant portion of the State's annual Medicaid 
budget, amounting to $207.6 million in 2005 alone - making Medicaid the largest buyer 
of pharmaceuticals in the state. Id. 
Rather than purchase the drugs directly from the manufacturers, Medicaid pays for 
drug benefits in much the same way a health insurer does through provider 
reimbursement. Id. at f^ 106. For example, when a Medicaid recipient goes to a 
pharmacy to fill a prescription, she gives the pharmacy her Medicaid number. The 
pharmacy fills the prescription, bills Medicaid for payment, and then Medicaid 
reimburses the pharmacy at a set rate. That rate is set by administrative guidelines that 
are intended to give Medicaid the most competitive price and stretch taxpayer dollars 
further. Id. at f 107. In essence, the guidelines require the accurate wholesale price that 
manufacturers charge non-Medicaid buyers, and then use that price to calculate 
Medicaid's price. Id. As such, the guidelines depend upon accurate wholesale pricing 
information. 
Medicaid has no way of collecting the wholesale pricing information on its own; 
therefore, drug makers agree to provide the information to industry reporting service 
companies such as First DataBank ("Blue Book"), Medical Economics, Inc. ("Red 
Book"), and Medispan. Id. at \ 118 (R. at 1139). These companies then aggregate the 
prices they receive from the drug makers and convert them into price indexes that reflect 
the drugs' average prices. Id. Drug manufacturers are aware of this and agree to 
participate through the Medicaid Provider Agreement.2 See Addendum F, Utah State 
Medicaid Plan, attachment 4.19-B, section S: Prescribed Drugs, 19—19b; see also id, at f 
107 (R. at 1135). 
The most common and widely-used indexes are: (1) the "Average Wholesale 
Price" or "AWP" (commonly understood as the average price charged by wholesalers to 
retailers for a drug); (2) "Wholesale Acquisition Cost" or "WAC" (commonly understood 
as the average price paid by wholesalers to the drug manufacturers themselves); and (3) 
"Direct Price" (commonly understood as the price charged by the drug makers to non-
wholesale customers). PL's Second Am. Compl. at f 107 (R. at 1135). These indexes are 
used by Medicaid agencies nationwide, including Utah's, to determine their prices as 
mandated by law. Id, at ffif 116, 118, and 119 (R. at 1138 and 1139). When a pharmacy 
bills Medicaid for a prescription, Medicaid determines its payment and pays the 
2
 Medical providers that participate in the Medicaid program sign the Medicaid Provider 
Agreement, which sets forth guidelines for the provider's involvement in the program. 
pharmacy based on the appropriate index. All of this depends upon the drug 
manufacturers' honest reporting of their prices. 
Defendants5 Fraudulent Actions 
The formula used to determine Medicaid's payment for these drugs is set by 
federal and state regulation and relies heavily upon Defendants' honest and accurate 
reporting of the prices they charge other wholesale buyers. Addendum G, Plaintiffs 
Second Amended Complaint at fflf 107 and 116 (R. at 1135 and 1138). However, when 
dealing with Medicaid, Defendants did not report real wholesale prices, but instead gave 
inflated prices that were higher than what they charged others. Id. at fflf 118-121 (R. at 
1139-1140). This was allegedly done to increase the drugs' profit margins and thereby 
increase market share, as described more fully below. PL's First Am. Compl. at fflj 49-56 
(R. at 051-054). As a result, Medicaid paid inflated prices for Defendants' drugs. PL's 
Second Am. Compl. \ 1 (R. at 1118). This occurred with hundreds of different drugs 
over many thousands of individual transactions, causing tens of millions of dollars in 
overpayment. Id.\ see also PL's Second Am. Compl., Exhibit A (R. at 1147-1185); see 
also PL's First Am. Compl. ffll 44 and 52 (R. at 049 and 052). 
Instead of reporting accurate pricing information, Defendants reported false and 
inflated pricing to the reporting companies like First DataBank. Defendants reported 
prices that bore no relation to any real price charged to non-Medicaid buyers; rather, the 
reported prices were arbitrarily set by Defendants at rates that were significantly higher 
than true wholesale price. Id. at If 118 (R. at 1139). As a result, the price indexes 
calculated from the reporting companies' reports were also inflated, causing Medicaid to 
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pay significantly higher prices than other wholesale buyers for the same drugs. Id. at If 
119. 
Each Defendant used the above manipulation to increase their profits indirectly. 
As noted above, Defendants sold their drugs to pharmacies and other medical providers, 
rather than directly to Medicaid. Because of the inflated indexes caused by Defendants' 
false reports, their drugs carried a higher profit margin for those providers when they, in 
turn, sold them to Medicaid. Id. at Tf 116 (R. at 1138). Defendants exploited this market 
advantage to sell more of their drugs to those providers, thereby increasing their profits 
and market share at the State's expense. Id. 
Nationwide Litigation 
Because of Defendants' scheme, Medicaid agencies nationwide overpaid for drug 
benefits by hundreds of millions of dollars. As a result, multiple Medicaid agencies have 
filed suit against Defendants in an attempt to recover these funds. PL's Resp. in Opp. to 
Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. 5-6 (R. at 1497-1498). The evidence collected 
through discovery in these cases shows that Defendants engaged in the described 
behavior over extended periods of time, all at the expense of the various Medicaid 
programs. 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
In response, Defendants filed and/or joined a motion to dismiss under Rules 9(b) 
and 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Addendum D, Memorandum 
Decision, Feb. 13, 2009 (R. at 1061-1073). Defendants argued that the State's claims did 
not meet the pleading requirements of Utah law. Defendants cited Rule 9(b)'s 
requirement that allegations of fraud be pled "with particularity" and argued that this 
standard applies to the False Claims Act as well. Two subgroups of defendants brought 
their own additional motions to dismiss. Defendant Boehringer Ingelheim Corp. ("BIC") 
argued that some of its drugs were produced by corporate subsidiaries and that the State 
failed to identify only those drugs for which BIC alone was legally responsible. Id. at 7 
(R. at 1067). A group of generic drug manufacturers collectively known as the "Generic 
Defendants" also filed a motion stating that their drug prices relied upon different 
standards than AWP. The Generic Defendants argued that the State's complaint failed to 
identify how inflated price reports affected the generic drug payment standards. 
Finally, Defendants noted that the Legislature had amended the False Claims act 
on April 30, 2007. The significant changes in the amendment included: 
(1) lowering the mens rea required for a violation of the Act from "willfully" 
to "knowingly." Compare Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-2 (2004) with Utah 
Code Ann. § 26-20-9.5 (2007); 
(2) increasing the civil penalty from the range of $l,000-$2,000 to $5,000-
$10,000 and making it mandatory, instead of discretionary. Id; and 
(3) adding of an Act-specific statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-
20-15 (Supp. 2009). 
Defendants argued that the State was inappropriately attempting to retroactively 
apply these changes for claims occurring before the amendment was enacted. Id. at 8 (R. 
at 1068). 
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The State opposed Defendants' motions, arguing that a complaint under the False 
Claims Act is not subject to Rule 9(b) and that such a complaint need only plead the 
elements found within the Act. See PL's Memo, in Opp. to Defs. Motion to Dismiss (R. 
at 662-690). Moreover, the State argued, regardless of Rule 9(b)'s application to both 
causes of action, the State's complaint was pled with enough particularity to give 
Defendants adequate notice of their alleged conduct - especially in light of the many 
other lawsuits filed against Defendants with the exact same allegations. Id. As to the 
2007 amendment to the False Claims Act, the State argued that the amendment's plain 
language made it retroactively applicable to Defendants' actions. Id. 
Judge Medley agreed with Defendants' arguments concerning the specificity of 
the State's claims, but granted the State the opportunity to file a Second Amended 
Complaint. See Addendum D, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 13, 2009 (R. at 1061-1073). 
Judge Medley instructed the State that, in order to properly plead its claim of fraud under 
Rule 9(b), it must identify: 
(1) each specific drug; 
(2) each manufacturer, seller, and price reporter of each drug; 
(3) each specific false pricing report, including when and to whom it was 
made; and 
(4) whether the State relied upon each specific false pricing report. 
Id. at 6 (R. at 1066). 
Moreover, Judge Medley held that such Rule 9(b) specifics also applied to the 
False Claims Act, and therefore the State must identify each claim submitted to Medicaid 
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as a result of Defendants' conduct and the benefit Defendants derived from the same.3 
Id. at 7 (R. at 1067). The judge also instructed the State to provide the detail demanded 
by BIC and the Generic Defendants in their motions. Id. With respect to retroactivity of 
the 2007 amendment to the False Claims Act, Judge Medley ruled that the statute of 
limitations may be retroactively applied, but neither the lowered mens rea nor the 
increased civil penalties could be retroactively applied. Id. at 8-9 (R. at 1068-1069). 
The State's Amended Complaint and Dismissal 
On March 31, 2009, the State filed its Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter 
"the Second Amended Complaint" attached hereto as Addendum G). In it, the State more 
fully identified each defendant, included a list of the drugs for which each defendant 
provided false pricing information, and sought to meet the trial court's other instructions. 
Defendants filed renewed motions to dismiss with prejudice on the same grounds 
as their original motions with the added argument that the State's claims under the False 
Claims Act are limitations-barred. See Addendum E, Memorandum Decision, Feb. 26, 
2010 (R. at 2055-2070).The State again opposed these motions, arguing that it had 
provided as much specificity as was reasonable in a concise and comprehensible 
complaint and that the statute had not run. Id. 
Judge Medley again agreed with Defendants. Id. He ruled that the requirements 
of Rule 9(b) applied with equal force to common law fraud and the False Claims Act, and 
that the State had again failed to meet that standard against all defendants. He also ruled 
o 
Despite the fact that actual receipt of a benefit is not an element of a cause of action 
under the Act. 
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that, according to the reasoning of his previous ruling, the applicable statute of limitations 
had expired on any alleged violations that occurred more than one year prior to the 
amending of the False Claims Act. Judge Medley therefore dismissed the State's claims 
with prejudice. This appeal now seeks to overturn that ruling. 
Summary of the Argument 
The State properly pled its Second Amended Complaint under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Utah requires only a notice pleading, which is a liberal pleading 
standard. A complaint must give only sufficient notice of the issues and an opportunity to 
meet them; it need not provide every detail of its case. The State's complaint pled the 
elements of the False Claims Act and common law fraudulent misrepresentation and 
alleged the surrounding facts with sufficient particularity. Notably, Defendants' conduct 
has sparked similar litigation throughout the nation. Consequently, the State's complaint 
and nationwide litigation provided Defendants with fair notice of the claims. 
Moreover, the trial court incorrectly ruled that the statute of limitations has run on 
many of the State's claims. The court ruled that a one-year statute of limitations applies 
to the State's claims. This is incorrect for three reasons. First, the amended Utah False 
Claims Act provides for at least a three-year limitations period; this is a procedural 
amendment and should be applied retroactively. Second, the pre-amendment limitations 
period was at least four years, not one year. Finally, Defendants violated the Act each 
time an overpriced bill was submitted to Medicaid, not when pricing was reported. Thus, 
every new claim for payment based on an inflated price causes the limitations period to 
begin anew against the respective Defendants. As such, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court overturn the trial court's ruling and remand this case for further 
proceedings. Defendants' comprehensive response to the State's claims evidences their 
sufficient understanding of the issues involved. 
Argument 
I. The State's Second Amended Complaint Properly Pled the State's Causes of 
Action Under Utah Law. 
The Second Amended Complaint was proper under Utah law. The State is not 
required to plead every detail of its case in the complaint; it must only give Defendants 
adequate notice of the claims against them so that they may prepare a defense. The 
State's Second Amended Complaint accomplished this and required no more particularity 
or detail under the law. The State pled that each Defendant has violated the False Claims 
Act and committed fraudulent misrepresentation against Medicaid, including alleged 
facts sufficient to fulfill the elements of both claims. The State's complaint is therefore 
proper, and the case should be allowed to proceed. 
A. The second amended complaint properly pled the State's claim of fraudulent 
misrepresentation. 
In Utah, a plaintiff need only give a defendant "fair notice of the nature and basis 
or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). The State's Second 
Amended Complaint contains two separate and independent causes of action that meet 
this standard and provide such notice to Defendants. The complaint was therefore 
adequate. 
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i. Utah's pleading rule for fraud under Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Utah's liberal pleading standard, found in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, requires only that a complaint give a "short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,1' with averments that "shall be simple, 
concise, and direct. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) and (e)(1). In addition, Rule 9, which governs 
the pleading of special matters, requires that complaints alleging fraud must state "the 
circumstances constituting fraud . . . with particularity." Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). These two 
rules are read and interpreted in harmony with one another. See Williams, 656 P.2d 971. 
Thus, the State's complaint should be "short and plain," and its allegations of fraud need 
only be stated with enough "particularity" to give Defendants notice of the claims against 
them. 
In its 1982 decision in Williams, this Court specifically examined the interaction 
between Rules 8 and 9. Quoting earlier decisions, the Court reiterated that Utah's 
pleading rules "restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving" and that a 
complaint is "required only to . . . give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and 
basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." 
Williams, 656 P.2d at 970 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947) and 
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955)). The Court went on, '"What 
[defendants] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. 
When this is accomplished, that is all that is required'" Id. (quoting Cheney v. Rucker, 
381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963) (emphasis in original)). 
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Turning to specific pleadings of fraud, the Court again referred to established 
reasoning: "It is to be noted that the terms 'fraud,' 'conspiracy' and 'negligence,' are but 
general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the pleader . . . The basic facts must 
be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such 
charges." Id. (quoting Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962) (emphasis in 
original)). The Court then explained the interplay between the two rules: 
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" are terms of uncertain meaning. They are 
conclusions that must be fleshed out by elaboration and by consideration of 
the context in which they are used. This is why Rule 9(b) requires that the 
circumstances constituting fraud "shall be stated with particularity" a 
requirement we have construed to require allegation of the substanceof the 
acts constituting the alleged wrong. 
Id. at 972 (emphasis added). 
The Court's statement makes it clear that Rule 9(b) does not impose a higher 
standard of notice upon pleadings of fraud; rather, the Rule's purpose is to ensure that 
such pleadings, with their naturally "uncertain meaning," provide nothing more than the 
same level of "notice of the issues raised" to the defendant. 
To accomplish this, a claim of fraud must plead the substance of the acts 
constituting the alleged wrong by pleading the relevant facts surrounding the fraudulent 
conduct. In its 2001 decision of Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, H 14, 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah 
2001), this Court built upon the Williams decision and reiterated this interpretation: 
While we have stressed . . . that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, 
unsupported by a recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to 
preclude . . . summary judgment, a sufficiently clear and specific 
description of the facts underlying the plaintiffs claim of fraudulent 
concealment will satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). Our liberalized 
pleading rules are designed "to afford parties the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, 
subject only to the requirement that their adversary have fair notice of the 
nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the 
type of litigation involved" 
Hill, 2001 UT 16 at Tj 14 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
The Court's explanation makes it clear that Rule 9(b) is not an exacting standard. 
It does not require every detail of every instance of fraud but only a "sufficiently clear 
and specific description of the facts" to give a defendant "fair notice of the nature and 
basis or grounds of the claim and the type of litigation involved." To this day, Utah 
courts consistently apply this standard to afford plaintiffs the greatest opportunity to 
sustain claims founded injustice. See Casaday v. Allstate, 2010 UT App 82, ]f 16, 232 
P.3d 1075 ("Even if a complaint is 'vague,' 'inartfully drafted,' a 'bare-bones outline,' or 
'not a model of specificity,' the complaint may still be adequate so long as it can 
reasonably be read as supporting a claim for relief, giving the defendant notice of that 
claim.") (Internal citations omitted.) {citing Canfield v. Lay ton City, 2005 UT 60, ]f 14, 
122 P.3d 622 (holding that orders for dismissal or even to amend "are not generally 
favored, and should only be granted when the complaint is so indefinite, ambiguous, or 
vague in either its factual allegations or its legal theory that the moving party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame his responsive pleading." (Internal quotations omitted.))). 
ii. The State's Second Amended Complaint set forth the relevant 
surrounding facts of Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentation and 
met the requirements of Rule 9(b). 
The Second Amended Complaint satisfied the requirements of Rule 9(b) by setting 
forth the relevant surrounding facts of Defendants' conduct and providing them notice of 
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the State's claims. It identified each Defendant and each Defendant's participation in the 
State's Medicaid prescription drug program, including the specific drugs each Defendant 
provided to that program. It described the scheme that Defendants used to manipulate 
Medicaid's payment for those drugs, the motive for doing so, the State's reliance upon 
Defendants' misrepresentations, and the end result of Medicaid's overpayment. The 
Second Amended Complaint plainly and concisely stated the relevant facts surrounding 
Defendants' misconduct. 
The law does not require more to file a proper complaint. Judge Medley's ruling 
that the State must identify every instance of misrepresented pricing in order to satisfy 
Rule 9(b) is not supported by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or their interpreting 
cases. Defendants' conduct was ongoing for at least fifteen years, with false pricing 
reports being regularly provided to the reporting companies. Defendants likely made 
thousands of individual price reports, though the numbers and detail of every 
misrepresentation is unknown to the State at this time. However, even if all details were 
known, their inclusion in the complaint would surely violate the requirement that the 
pleading be "short and plain" with "simple, concise, and direct" averments, and such 
details are not necessary to satisfy Utah's "liberalized pleading rules." 
Moreover, with multiple lawsuits across the country arising from Defendants' 
conduct, they know precisely what the State's allegations entail and have ample notice of 
the claims against them. By their very nature, Utah's liberal notice pleading rules charge 
defendants with their own knowledge of the alleged acts and consider that knowledge in 
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judging the adequacy of a pleading. Were this not the case, a mere "notice pleading" 
could never be sufficient. 
In a 1996 case involving a lease dispute, the Utah Court of Appeals used this 
reasoning to reject the defendant corporation's argument that the plaintiff had not 
adequately pled claims against a sister corporation, and that the complaint thus failed to 
provide adequate notice: 
[Defendant] had notice of the claims at issue as well as the grounds upon 
which they were based. The principals in [the defendant and the sister 
corporation] were the same, and [an official of both] negotiated the 
assignment of the lease and was heavily involved in the project from the 
beginning. In addition, it is apparent from the defenses raised by [the 
defendant] that it understood precisely what claims were being made and to 
which agreement they pertained. Under these circumstances, there can be 
no doubt that [the defendant] had notice of [the plaintiffs] claim. 
Consol Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
see also Burr v. Childs, 265 P.2d 383, 387 (Utah 1953) (indicating "The deficiencies 
suggested by defendant impliedly acknowledge a full understanding of the nature of 
plaintiffs1 claim."); see generally Casady, 2010 UT App 82 (holding that the defendant's 
independent knowledge of the nature of the claims barred it from arguing that the 
plaintiffs complaint provided insufficient notice). 
The Defendants' responsive pleadings show that they had full understanding of the 
State's claims. See Memo, in Support of D.'s Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Jul. 31, 2008 
(R. at 274-391). For example, in its Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss the Amended Complaint, Defendant Pfizer explained the Medicaid 
reimbursement process in some detail, including an understanding of the various pricing 
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indexes and express disagreements with the State's interpretation of the same. Id. at 3-7 
(R. at 282-286). In its memorandum, Defendant Pfizer argues it had insufficient notice 
and understanding of the State's claims. Within the same memorandum, however, 
Pfizer's arguments demonstrate a deep understanding of highly complex regulations, 
pricing schemes, and the State's claims arising out of them. It is therefore clear that 
Defendants know and understand the State's claims. 
Some of the earliest cases documenting Defendants' actions commenced nearly 
ten years ago. Defendants' various memoranda make it clear how familiar they are with 
the nature of the State's claim. Defendants' attempt to now "play dumb" regarding the 
State's claims insults the intelligence of anyone familiar with this case and seeks only to 
exploit a legal technicality. Despite Defendants' feigned ignorance, the Second 
Amended Complaint provides sufficient notice of the claims against them and satisfies 
the appropriate pleading standard. To find that Rule 9(b) has not been satisfied is to find 
that Defendants do not have enough notice of their alleged conduct and will not have fair 
opportunity to mount a defense. This is clearly not the case. As such, the State's 
pleadings are sufficient under Utah law. 
iii. The State's Second Amended Complaint properly pled the elements of 
fraudulent misrepresentation. 
The proper pleading of a cause of action for fraud requires nine elements: (1) that 
a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact (3) which was 
false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, 
knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation 
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(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and (6) that the other party, 
acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was 
thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. See Gold Standard, Inc. v. 
Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 (Utah 1996). 
The State's Second Amended Complaint fulfills the nine elements by adequately 
pleading the following facts: 
• (1), (2), and (3): Defendants made false representations about the pricing of their 
drugs to the reporting companies. Second Amended Complaint, f^ 134 (R. at 
1143) (see also the allegations in each named Defendant's individual section of 
the Second Amended Complaint); 
• (4): Defendants knew of the falsity of their reports, making their conduct 
"knowing and intentional." Id. at ffij 134, 139 (R. at 1143-1144); 
• (5): Defendants knew the State would act on the false information in setting their 
drug reimbursement rates and acted with the purpose of inducing it to do so. Id. 
atffl[134,135; 
• (6)(a): The State acted reasonably upon Defendants' pricing reports. Id. at ^ 115, 
116(R. 1138-1139); 
• (6)(b): The State was unaware of the true pricing of Defendants' drugs because 
Defendants actively concealed those prices; therefore, the State was unaware of 
their falsity. Id. at f|f 13, 20, 28, 33, 40, 45, 50, 55, 61, 69, 74, 81, 86, 91, 96, 
103, &122(R. at 1121-1140); 
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• (7): The State did rely upon Defendants' representations to the reporting 
companies. Id. at^ f 136 (R. at 1143); 
• (8): The State was induced to act by Defendants' reports. Id.; and 
• (9): The State was damaged by overpaying for Defendants' drugs as a direct result 
of Defendants' false reports. Id. at If 137 (R. at 1144). 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Utah law requires no more specificity than 
what is found in the Second Amended Complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(e). As such, the 
complaint properly pled the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation. Moreover, the 
relevant surrounding facts of Defendants' actions were clearly stated with sufficient 
particularity to provide them with adequate "notice of the issues raised and the 
opportunity to meet them." Williams, 656 P.2d at 970. "This is all that is required" 
under Utah law. Id. The State's claim for fraudulent misrepresentation against 
Defendants is therefore proper, and the State respectfully requests that the trial court's 
ruling be overturned and the case be allowed to proceed. 
B. The second amended complaint properly pled Defendants' violations of the 
False Claims Act. 
The State's other claim against Defendants is for violations of the Utah False 
Claims Act. The Second Amended Complaint properly stated the facts and elements of 
that claim under Utah law. 
i. The Utah False Claims Act is not governed by Rule 9(b). 
As the basis for part of its reasoning in finding the State's claims insufficient, the 
trial court held that allegations under the False Claims Act are governed by the pleading 
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rules for fraud under Rule 9(b). This is incorrect and is unsupported by any Utah 
authority. Fraud or fraudulent intent is not an element of a civil claim under the False 
Claims Act. The State does not need to allege fraud to bring a claim under the Act, and 
Rule 9(b) is therefore inapplicable. The State must only plead its claim with a "short and 
plain" statement of the case. 
Moreover, in enforcing a remedial statute, a state need not plead with specificity. 
In State ex rel Brady v. Publishing Clearing House, 787 A.2d 111 (Del. Ch. 2001), the 
Delaware Attomey General brought a claim against publishers alleging a violation of the 
Consumer Fraud Act and the Delaware Uniform Deceptive Practices Act. The publishers 
moved to dismiss the Delaware Attorney General's complaint under Delaware Rule 9(b), 
which is identical to the Utah Civil Rule 9(b). Those defendants claimed that the 
Attorney General did not plead with particularity. The court rejected the defendants' 
argument, holding: 
[T]he remedial goals of these two acts are inconsistent with the application 
of the particularized pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) to enforcement 
actions brought by the Attorney General to protect the consuming public. 
On the contrary, a requirement that the State plead with particularity the 
"who, what, where and when" of each and every one of 750,000 violations 
alleged would only serve to defeat the legislative mandate of the Attorney 
General in bringing actions such as these on behalf of the citizens of the 
State. 
Id at 117. 
Given these considerations, it is clear that Rule 9(b) does not apply to the False 
Claims Act, and the State's claims do not need to conform to its requirements of 
"particularity." 
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ii. Even if Rule 9(b) applies, the State's pleadings under the False Claims 
Act satisfies the rule. 
Even if the standards of Rule 9(b) applied to the State's claims under the False 
Claims Act - which they do not - the State's pleadings satisfied that rule. As noted 
above, Rule 9(b)'s purpose is to give claims of fraud "sufficient particularity to show 
what facts are claimed" and thereby provide "notice of the issues raised and an 
opportunity to meet them." Williams, 656 P.2d at 970. The State's Second Amended 
Complaint accomplishes this with respect to violations of the False Claims Act. 
The Second Amended Complaint clearly explained that Defendants provided false 
and inflated pricing information to First DataBank, et al.9 over the statutory time covered 
by the State's claim. The complaint stated that Medicaid used Defendants' information 
to set its payment rates for their drugs and that Defendants thereby caused both the 
submission of prescription drug claims based upon false information and Medicaid's 
overpayment for those prescription drug benefits. The complaint then alleged that such 
conduct violated the False Claims Act. These allegations provide Defendants with 
sufficient notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them, and therefore 
satisfy Rule 9(b). 
The trial court ruled that Defendants do not have enough notice of their alleged 
conduct and will not have fair opportunity to mount a defense. This is clearly not the 
case. Defendants are aware of the nature of the claims against them and have sufficient 
information to defend themselves from the State's claims. Indeed, Defendants are 
already engaged in such defense with the myriad of other litigation involving the same 
claims by other states. 'This is all that is required" under Utah law, and Rule 9(b) has 
been met by the State's pleadings under the False Claims Act. 
iii. The second amended complaint properly pled the elements of the False 
Claims Act. 
The State's claims under the False Claims Act are based on Utah Code Ann. §§ 
26-20-3, 26-20-4, and 26-20-7 (2004), as set forth by the Second Amended Complaint. 
Second Amended Complaint, *|J 125. While Defendants violated many provisions within 
these statutes, the subsections that are most relevant to the State's claims are: 
§ 26-20-3. False statement or representation relating to medical benefits 
(1) A person shall not make or cause to be made a false statement or false 
representation of a material fact in an application for medical benefits. 
(2) A person shall not make or cause to be made a false statement or false 
representation of a material fact for use in determining rights to a medical 
benefit. 
§ 26-20-4. Kickbacks or bribes prohibited 
A person may not solicit, offer, pay, or receive a kickback or bribe [defined 
as rebates, compensation, or any other form or remuneration] in connection 
with the furnishing of goods or services for which payment is or may be 
made in whole or in part pursuant to a medical benefit program, or pay or 
receive a rebate of a fee or charge for referring an individual to another 
person for the furnishing of goods or services. 
§ 26-20-7. False claims for medical benefits prohibited 
(1) No person may make or present or cause to be made or presented to an 
employee or officer of the state a claim for a medical benefit, knowing the 
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent; 
(2) In addition, no person shall knowingly: 
(c) file a claim for a medical benefit representing charges at a higher 
rate than those charged by the provider to the general public. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-20-3,4, 7 (2004). 
Ilit' Mate ^ Second "'Uiiendenl ( umpkiinl .n!ei(ua(e!\ pled the elements of the 
claims arising from these statutory provisions. 
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are directly related lo medical benefits because they directly determine the benefits that 
Medicaid will pay for in the ior;n v>; piosenpuon ciu.L \.K i J l t s 
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Moreover, Defendants' ii.. , .i>v . • *: -^  • * 
represented higher rates than those charged to the general public and to other wholesalers. 
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants knew their pricing 
reports would be used to calcuiak J\IUUU(IG < payment rates ai id tl lat inflate :I i epc its 
would result in inflated payments. Id. This was the entire point of the scheme, and 
Defendants therefore acted "willfully." 
Noticeably absent from the prohibitions in the statutes above (and therefore from 
the elements of a cause of action under them) is any requirement that a defendant actually 
receive a benefit from Medicaid, either directly or indirectly. The trigger for civil 
liability is only the making or causation of a false claim. Therefore, the law does not 
support the trial court's ruling that the State must specify the benefits that Defendants 
collected. 
The State pled all necessary elements of its case under the False Claims Act. The 
Second Amended Complaint's pleadings under the False Claims Act gave Defendants 
adequate and fair notice of the State's claims and satisfied Utah's notice pleading 
standards. Hence, the State's claims under the False Claims Act were proper and should 
not have been dismissed. The State respectfully asks the Court to overturn the dismissal. 
II. The Applicable Statute of Limitations for the Utah False Claims Act Did Not 
Expire Prior to the State's Complaint. 
The trial court ruled that a one-year statute of limitations applied to the State's 
claims under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(3). Because of this, the trial court ruled that, 
in addition to its other reasons for dismissal, the statute of limitations had expired on all 
of the State's claims that predated the complaint by more than one year. See Mem. 
Decision, Feb. 26, 2010 at 10 (R. at 2064). 
The trial court's ruling was incorrect for three reasons. First, a 2007 legislative 
amendment to the False Claims Act created a new statutory period of at least three years 
and exnre^:; ....-- • - • w-'-.i, able statute of 
, . .
 ) i ls 5efore the amendment was at least four years under the general statute in Ut.ih 
Code \nn. § 78B-2-307, and perhaps even six years unde- < :•-.- • s -e 
iJeienuahLs' agreements \uth !lit Sink win based -.11 .1 w nlleii mstiunieiil I inally, 
\.gah i- •- •* J •' \iuiation of the Act occurs whenever a bill based 
upon the inflated pricing is submitted to Medicaid ' v : when that pricing was reported. 
Thus, every new claim for payment of a given drug causes tnc siaiu; •• \ .\- . IK , mi 
anew against the ie^>eeti\e Defendanl. 
1
 1 The 2007 amended statute of limitations should be retroactively applied to 
this case, pursuant to the Legislature's direct language. 
In 2007, the Legislature added if.e ioiiovvmg statute 01 iinii;.;.-,): 
Uai:..: .. 
.k. .<!i{!ei il:.^ cnapte! :n«:\ n-i :x brought after the later .if 
.a six years after the date 01; \\lucr. i!k violation was committed 1 
three \C;IN af;e; :IK dan cc official ^1 W\v stale charged www 
responsibility to act in the circumstances discovers the violation, but in :;<> 
event more than 10 \ea;s aftc t'^- date on which the v;o!ati.">n • -
committed. 
'::r , ;»..ie \m: § 26-20-15vi, ( V J I ^ 2009). 
Prior to wis amendment, the Ac! did ^o* unve a specific statute r-i nutations. 
W ith the amencii *•;•:. n^ ...
 r„;s.^.: , . .\}»IL-SM^ ;>.;. . •; ^ :V:T-- : r-- •• ' • -\ t i\ il 
aeti'Mi hiviii.'ht uii'lri Ihh ehaplrr may be brought for acts occurring prior to the effective 
date of this section if the limitations period set forth in Subsection (1) has not lapsed." Id. 
at §26-20-15(2). 
The State filed its complaint after the amendment to the statute of limitations 
period; therefore, the new limitations period applies to its complaint. See State v. Lusk, 
2001 UT 102, t 26, 37 P.3d 1103 (Utah 2001) ("We hold that a statutory amendment 
enlarging a statute of limitations will extend the limitations period applicable to a crime 
already committed only if the amendment becomes effective before the previously 
applicable statute of limitations has run . . . ."). A change in the statute of limitations is 
procedural, and the change may be applied retroactively. See Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 
2010 UT 12,1f 14, 227 P.3d 256 ("[a] statute may be given retroactive effect if it changed 
prior law in ways that are merely procedural."); see also Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 575 
(Utah 1993) ("Statutes of limitations are essentially procedural in nature . . . and do not 
abolish a substantive right."); State Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52, 
If 12, 975 P.2d 939 (Utah App. 1999). 
B. Prior to the amendment, the applicable statute of limitations for violations of 
the Act was at least four years under Title 78B, Chapter 2 Of The Utah Code, 
The 2007 amendment does not unfairly reopen limitations periods that had expired 
prior to its adoption. Because the Act did not contain a specific statute of limitations 
prior to the amendment, the general statutes of limitation found in Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2 would have applied. This means that a statutory period of at least four years under 
the general "catch-all" statute, and perhaps even six years for actions based upon a 
writing, applied to the Act. Any potential claims still open under these statutory periods 
remained open under the amended Act. 
1 scu that the one-year statute of limitations found in 
^ ~8B-2-302(3), \wiivL go^cri:> certain types of penalties, applies to all of the State's 
claims under the Act. However, this ruling ignores the various types i .<• - • 
• • : '-:-. f : ~XB-2-302(3). 
I l i t false Liainii Act provides for three different types of ci- >; remedies: full 
restitutio!! of the State's dam^e* paxment r f all the Stated costs of entorcement of the 
A r f ro^ a given vjoii/.io;. . 
(2004 " A',)!, ivspirt lo the claims for restitution and costs of enforcement, the default 
statute of limitations of four years would generally apph 5V e Utah Code Ann § 78B-2-
307(3); see also generally Quick /•*/•< //.M ...•, , . , /, , 
"'Ydir-ud ;Hio program, mw 
pharmaceutical companies also signed a "rebate" agreement to winch the SI^IL \*„- * 
party, That agreement required the pharmaceutical companies to obey state law and 
Imu In i\ on ill I unyoke a statute ol limitations of six years. Utah Code , \ i m . § 78B-2-309(2) 
(2008), As such, the limitations period foi those claims did m.-- :».i / r o r to either the 
2007 amendment or the State's complaint. 
' u V ; pro\ idea the same remedies prior to the 200/ umciuju.uu as wen. txcepi.ng 
that the civil penali\ of up to ^2,000 at the time was disc-*4. '"•::" ^ ! 1ii>k r—h* *••• § 
29 
C. Regardless of the applicable limitations period, it begins to run a new every 
time a false claim is submitted based on Defendants9 inflated pricing. 
This Court has consistently held that a cause of action does not accrue, and a 
corresponding limitations period does not begin to run, until all necessary elements of the 
action are present. See generally Johnson v. State, 945 P.2d 673 (Utah 1997). 
Accordingly, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run on false claims cases until the 
false claim for benefits is actually made, regardless of the timing of the false information 
or report that caused the claim. Thus, the State's cause of action accrues and the statute 
begins to run when a pharmacy bills Medicaid for payment based on a rate that was 
calculated using Defendants' false pricing information; it did not begin to run when that 
information was first provided because the cause of action had not accrued. In other 
words, Medicaid's latest receipt of an inflated bill for a given drug creates a cause of 
action against the drug's manufacturer, regardless of when the defendant gave the 
inflated pricing report. As a result, Defendants' liability for all of the False Claims Act's 
remedies and penalties is subject to a renewed statutory period with every false claim 
made. 
Given these considerations, the trial court relied on the wrong statute of limitations 
period. The trial court ignored the express language of the Act's legislative amendment 
and the applicability of the general statutes of limitation found in Title 78B, Chapter 2 of 
the Utah Code. It also misinterpreted the time when a cause of action accrues under the 
False Claims Act. The State therefore asks the Court to overturn the trial court's 
decision. 
30 
Conclus ion 
This case will determine the State 's ability to protect the integrity of its Medicaid 
program.. If Judge Medley ' s decision stands., the State will be denied the abi.li.ty to 
n t l o i a ilte I als't1 ( L i n u s \ u a«j"aiiiM ,i hnsi ml fiiliarmatvufical companies ihni 11 • i • t 
manipulated and exploited Medicaid for their own financial gain. Abuse of &uch 
programs must stop, or the State v il* \u* ims^er be able \o afford the legitimate aid needed 
by so many. I he State has justifiably ICJJCG ^\, . -cienjar.ts ' false representations ...... 
The State seeks nothing more than to compensate tax payers for these o \ eipaid funds and 
lo communicate to providers that they must follow the law. 
•v. .: . . - I tin- i I ill! Liv I.HI\ t liiiiiiiJ llinii tin. Miilr res!"",<'t' s 
•VJIK-:* rw ( ouii nold that the; <J; State's Second Amended Complaint was propc;i\ 
pled under both the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the False Claims Act, and satisfied 
all applicable requirements cr IDOSL juniorities sunJv;cnt to p^.\ ;^ Dciei aa-i; . •;. 
adequate 110ti.ee of the State's claims • " -egislati\ e A mendments to the I 'alse 
Claims Act are to be applied retroactix el> in their entirety, in accordance with, the 
Legislature's express language in Utah Code Ann § 26-20-15(2); and (3) applko-Me 
slalud" nl limitations has nul run and di >,-«i m I ku lilt S ta i r ' s i. Linns. 
In accordance with this request, the State asks the Court to reverse the district 
court and remand this action to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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